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Abstract 
Elicitation of people’s knowledge is a central methodological 
challenge for psychology, with important impacts in many 
technical disciplines and industrial settings. The need to 
convert an expert’s beliefs into a useable format is of 
particular importance when judgments and decisions are made 
under uncertainty. Simply asking a person for their best 
estimate or to estimate a range is subject to many biases – 
e.g., overconfidence – and methods for eliciting information 
that avoid these effects are required. This paper presents a 
heuristic-based elicitation method, More-Or-Less Elicitation 
(MOLE) which, rather than requiring people make absolute 
judgments, asks them to make repeated relative judgments. 
MOLE uses these, along with confidence statements, to 
construct probability distributions (pdfs) representing a 
person’s beliefs. We evaluate MOLE by comparing these 
subjective pdfs with ranges elicited using traditional methods. 
The central finding is that use of MOLE greatly improves the 
accuracy and precision of elicited ranges, thereby reducing 
overconfidence. The benefits of this and other possible 
heuristic-based methods of elicitation are discussed. 
Keywords: Elicitation, Uncertainty, Overconfidence, 
Heuristic. 
 
Many technical disciplines share with psychological 
research the problem of eliciting information from people; 
that is, translating peoples’ beliefs into useable data 
(Wolfson, 2001). Of particular interest is how to best 
achieve this under uncertainty, where there is no single, 
correct answer but rather the “correct” response for an 
individual to make will vary according to their own level of 
knowledge about the topic (Morgan & Henrion, 1990).  
The reason so much interest is vested in this area is that, 
despite elicitation’s ubiquity, argument continues about the 
best way to elicit information and people are still subject to 
many biases, so that elicited responses are less accurate than 
elicitors would wish (see, e.g., Hawkins, Coopersmith, & 
Cunningham, 2002; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 
1982; Welsh, Begg, & Bratvold, 2007). 
This paper discusses elicitation and some of its problems. 
Further, it proposes, as a possible solution, the use of 
heuristic-based methods – that is, elicitation methods based 
on simple judgments, such as which of two options is closer 
to the true value (i.e., the value the participant believes the 
stimulus takes). Such a method, called More-Or-Less 
Elicitation (MOLE), is tested and discussed herein. 
Elicitation 
The elicitation of uncertainty is the conversion of individual 
or group’s beliefs into a probability distribution. Generally, 
this is done not for its own sake but to, for example, predict 
future outcome ranges, or provide inputs for forecasting 
models (Morgan & Keith, 1995). 
In order to be of benefit, elicited values need to be 
accurate. Accuracy, in this case, however, refers to two 
separate ideas. The first sense, which we might call 
objective accuracy, is the one that naturally springs to mind: 
elicited values need to accurately reflect the probability of 
an event occurring. Equally important, however, is 
subjective accuracy: how well elicited values map onto an 
elicitee’s beliefs. The problem for elicitors is that the two 
are not easily separated. Instead we have to rely on 
relatively crude measures like overconfidence/calibration 
scores (Lichtenstein et al., 1982), which primarily measure 
objective accuracy even though, from the elicitor’s point of 
view, a measure of subjective accuracy is being sought. 
Problems for Elicitation 
Standard findings in the elicitation literature are that 
people’s best guesses are anchored by previously seen 
values and that they are overconfident, producing too 
narrow ranges of possible outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). There is also evidence, however, that this is not 
entirely due to inaccuracies in people’s beliefs. Specifically, 
different elicitation techniques result in different responses; 
Winman, Hansson and Juslin (2004), for example, 
demonstrate that having people evaluate a range rather than 
produce one leads to less overconfidence in their responses. 
There are also concerns about the effect of question order 
within an elicitation task. These date back to Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1974) paper, where they suggested that 
anchoring on an initial best guess might be a cause of 
overconfidence. Research into this idea, however, has been 
mixed with, for example, Russo and Schoemaker (1992) 
finding the predicted effect but Block and Harper (1991) 
and Juslin, Wennerholm and Olsson (1999) finding the 
opposite. To complicate matters further, there are concerns 
regarding the level of control over question order in some of 
these studies. For example, Block and Harper (1991) used 
answer booklets which, while having questions in a set 
order, could not insure they were answered in that order. 
Debiasing Elicitation 
Given these problems, significant work has gone into 
attempts to debias elicited values. Early work (summarised 
in Morgan & Henrion, 1990), however, indicated little 
success in reducing overconfidence and none for anchoring. 
As noted above, however, there are some techniques 
known to reduce overconfidence, including Winman et al’s 
(2004) use of interval assessment, and the use of long-term 
repeated feedback (Lichtenstein et al., 1982). Additionally, 
the use by expert elicitors of counterintuitive examples 
(lying outside the initial range) has been shown to be 
effective in reducing overconfidence (Hawkins et al., 2002). 
This remedy, though, requires an expert elicitor to be on 
hand to ask the right sorts of questions and leaves open the 
question of whether simply drawing people’s attention to 
regions of the possibility space outside their initial range is 
helpful in the absence of expertise. 
Regardless, none of these techniques eliminates 
overconfidence – excepting specific cases such as weather 
forecasting, where repeated feedback seems to have resulted 
in good calibration (Murphy & Winkler, 1977). 
Heuristic Elicitation 
Given the problems with elicitation and the observation that 
question format has a large impact on the elicited responses, 
it is worth considering more radical departures from the 
standard elicitation methods. For example, the work of 
Gigerenzer and others (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; 
Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) on bounded rationality has 
yielded insights into the sorts of questions that the human 
mind seems most comfortable working with. 
One observation is that people are better at making 
relative judgments than absolute ones (Gigerenzer & Selten, 
2001). This is consistent with Winman et al’s (2004) 
observation that people are better at evaluating than 
generating ranges. Combining this insight with the 
observation that counter-intuitive examples can reduce 
overconfidence (Hawkins et al., 2002) leads to the idea that 
asking a series of questions covering the range of 
possibility, rather than allowing a person to hone in on a 
small region of outcomes, thereby excluding other 
possibilities, may yield better results. 
The idea of such a heuristic-based elicitation method – 
using relative judgments – was first explored in Welsh, 
Begg, Bratvold and Lee (2004). This found a benefit but 
relied heavily on assumptions about the underlying 
distribution required to create a probability distribution from 
the relative judgments. The current goal was, thus, to create 
an elicitation method that makes minimal assumptions in a 
principled manner to produce the final distribution. 
 We aim for an elicitation method that is less subject to 
overconfidence than alternative methods requiring direct 
estimation of values. We are also interested in whether 
requiring a best guess first reduces or increases the width of 
estimated ranges, and whether simply drawing people’s 
attention to values outside their initial range is sufficient to 
widen those ranges. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 40 undergraduate students from the 
University of Adelaide. Four, however, were excluded due 
to computer errors during testing leaving 36 (10 male and 
26 female) with a mean age of 20.1 (SD = 1.9).  
Materials 
Four graphical user interfaces (GUIs) were developed to 
enable automated testing of participants using each of the 
elicitation methods chosen for examination. All of the GUIs 
displayed an array of circles, from 100 to 300 (determined 
randomly at each trial) and elicited the participant’s beliefs 
regarding the number of circles - in accordance with the 
varying elicitation techniques. 
Figure 1. MOLE GUI 
 
For each of the elicitation techniques, the same basic GUI 
layout was used, with only the questions being asked and 
the buttons that could be used to respond being different. 
For example, Figure 1 shows the layout as seen during 
More-or-Less Elicitation (MOLE) condition, asking 
participants to select which of two values is closer to their 
estimate. The GUI controls were sequentially locked and 
unlocked to ensure that participants answered each question 
before continuing to the next. This ensured that participants 
completed the questions in the prescribed order. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested on four elicitation methods, 
described below. Participants, over the course of an hour, 
completed ten trials under each condition after being sorted 
at random into four groups to allow counterbalancing for 
possible order/learning effects as shown in Table 1.  
Simple Elicitation 
In this condition, participants were asked to provide a 
minimum and maximum value for the number of circles. 
Following this, they indicated how confident they were that 
their range contained the true value. This was done using a 
slider similar to the one seen in Figure 1 but capable of 
taking any integer value from 0 to 100%. 
 
Table 1. Ordering of Elicitation Methods 
Group Elicitation Methods  
A 1 2 3 4 
B 4 3 2 1 
C 2 4 1 3 
D 3 1 4 2 
Note: 1=Simple, 2=Triangular, 3=Iterative, 4=MOLE  
Triangular Elicitation 
In this condition, participants were asked to provide a best 
guess prior to giving their minimum and maximum values – 
thereby providing sufficient information to produce a 
triangular distribution. Again, after making estimates, they 
were asked to indicate their confidence on a 0-100% scale. 
Iterative Elicitation  
In this condition, participants were asked to provide an 
initial range as in the Simple Elicitation condition but then 
shown values for the minimum and maximum that lay 
outside their own range - which were described as having 
been elicited from “previous participants” but which 
actually were always calculated by the program to lie 
outside the initial range (60% of the initial minimum and 
140% of the initial maximum). Participants were then given 
the chance to adjust their estimates of the minimum and 
maximum. Once happy with their estimates, they were 
asked to indicate their level of confidence that the true value 
would fall inside their range on a 0 to 100% range. 
More-Or-Less Elicitation 
In the MOLE condition, participants did not directly 
estimate values. Rather, they selected which alternative in 
randomly generated pairs of values from a range from 0 to 
400 was closer to their estimate. After each choice, 
participants were asked to indicate their confidence that 
their selection was actually closer to the true value than the 
alternative on a 50% (guessing) to 100% (certain) range.  
This process was repeated 10 times during each trial and 
the final range of feasible values recorded (i.e., those the 
participant’s answers did not rule out). Additionally, the 
confidence ratings were used to create a subjective PDF as 
described below. 
Whenever a confidence rating of 100% was given, any 
values lying closer to the unchosen value were excluded 
from the experimental range and then weight of 0.5 was 
added uniformly across the remaining range. If, however, 
the confidence level was less than 100%, weight was added 
to each end of the range separately according to the level of 
confidence. Figure 2 shows how two stages of this process 
might progress, starting with a range of possible value from 
90 to 150. In the top half of the figure, the person has been 
shown two values: 135 and 150 (highlighted) and stated 
with 100% confidence that 135 is closer to the true value.  
This means that values above 142.5 (the midway point of 
135 and 150) will no longer be considered. An equal weight 
of 0.5 is then applied across the entire remaining range, 
indicating ignorance about where in that range the person 
believes the true value lies. 
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Figure 2. Subjective PDF construction process. 
 
In the lower half of Figure 2, the person is then shown the 
values of 105 and 130 and states that they are 75% 
confident that 105 is closer to the true value. This results in 
a weight of 0.75 being applied from the current minimum 
up to the midpoint of the two values (117.5) and a weight of 
0.25 from the midpoint up to the current maximum – 
reflecting the fact that the person’s confidence statement 
indicates that they believe a value closer to the lower option 
is three times as likely as one closer to the high option. 
In this way, over the course of a trial, a PDF was built up. 
At the end of each trial, this PDF was corrected by 
removing all weight from areas outside the final feasible 
range and then adjusted by subtracting 99% of the lowest 
weight from all remaining areas. Finally, the 
Beta−distribution that minimized summed squared 
differences from the resultant PDF was calculated. 
Results 
As described above, while overconfidence is generally used 
as the primary measure of the efficacy of an elicitation 
method of the sorts used herein, this can be further divided 
into the accuracy and the precision of the elicited responses. 
Results relating to the primary hypothesis are therefore 
described below in terms of all three concepts: overall 
overconfidence, precision and accuracy. 
Overconfidence 
Overconfidence, in terms of elicited ranges, is measured 
from the degree of ‘coverage’ achieved (i.e, how often the 
elicited range was correct - that is, contained the true value) 
and participants’ stated levels of confidence. Table 2 shows 
this data for each of the four conditions.  
It is clear from Table 2 that all three techniques requiring 
participants to estimate absolute ranges resulted in less than 
30% coverage, despite the stated confidence of the 
participants averaging more than 70%. By comparison, the 
MOLE, with its assumed 100% confidence level, resulted in 
90.6% coverage. (The confidence level is ‘assumed’ as 
participants in the MOLE condition did not directly rate the 
likelihood of the true value falling within their final range, 
rather it was assumed that their final range contained all of 
the values they considered feasible.) 
 
Table 2. Coverage and mean confidence rating by condition. 
 
Condition Correct Trials# Coverage Confidence 
Simple 92 340 27.1% 75.5% 
Triangular 81 340 23.8% 72.6% 
Iterative       97 340 28.5% 72.7% 
MOLE 308 340 90.6% 100% * 
# - 20 of the 360 trials were excluded as individual analyses 
indicated that participants had either misinterpreted the 
experimental instruction or were deliberately answering incorrectly 
in order to limit their participation time. * - assumed confidence 
level. 
 
To determine whether the differences between the 
methods were statistically significant, a repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted. The first indicated that there were 
significant differences between the number of hits achieved 
by participants under the four conditions, F(3, 83) = 123.8, 
p <.001. Paired sample t-tests with Bonferroni corrections 
were used for each unique pair of elicitation methods to 
determine which conditions differed from the others and 
these indicated that only the MOLE condition differed 
significantly, t(35) = 14.1, 15.7 and 12.4 (from the Simple, 
Triangular and Iterative, respectively), p <.001 in all cases.  
The question remained, however, as to whether the 
improvement in calibration in the MOLE data resulted from 
an improvement in precision, accuracy, or both. 
Precision 
Precision reflects the subjective aspect of accuracy (i.e., 
how well a response matches the person’s knowledge and 
beliefs). The primary measure of precision in an elicited 
range is its width. Figure 3 shows the mean range width 
under each of the methods described above, along with the 
variability, as measured by the standard deviation. 
Looking at Figure 3, it seems clear that an improvement 
in the appropriateness of participants’ levels of precision 
plays a significant role in the observed reduction in 
overconfidence. Specifically, participants’ responses to the 
MOLE technique are far less precise, giving much wider 
ranges on average than in any of the other three conditions.   
The implication of this is that participants in the other 
conditions were too precise. That is, their ranges were far 
narrower than their level of knowledge warranted. A 
repeated measures ANOVA, run using the participants’ 
mean ranges in each condition, confirmed that the difference 
was highly significant, F(2, 59) = 75.9, p < .001. Once 
again, paired sample t-tests with Bonferroni corrections 
were used post-hoc confirming that only the MOLE results 
differed from the other conditions, t(35) = 8.6, 12.1 and 9.4 
for comparisons with the Simple, Triangular and Iterative 
methods, respectively, p < .001 in all cases. 



























Figure 3. Mean width of range by elicitation method. 
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Figure 4. Scatterplots comparing number of objects with the 
estimated mode for each elicitation condition. 
Accuracy 
To assess the objective accuracy of participants’ responses 
under each elicitation condition, the mode of each elicited 
range was compared with the true value. For the Simple and 
Iterative elicitation conditions, a uniform distribution was 
assumed and thus the mean (midpoint) was substituted for 
the mode. For the Triangular, the mode was the “most 
likely” value given by the participant. Finally, for the 
MOLE, the mode was calculated using the α and β values 
calculated from the beta distribution most closely fitting a 
participant’s subjective PDF, giving M = (α−1) / (α+β−2). 
Scatterplots showing these data are shown as Figure 4. 
Figure 4 suggests that only in the MOLE condition did 
participant estimates accurately track the number of objects 
in the stimuli. The correlation between the means of the 
estimated range and true values was moderately high and 
highly significant, r(338) = 0.64, p<.001, whereas 
correlations between the true values and the remaining 
elicited means were all extremely low, r(338) = -0.01, -0.10 
and -0.02 for the Simple, Triangular and Iterative method 
respectively, p > .05 in all cases. 
Other Findings 
Best Guesses and Overconfidence 
One of our initial research questions asked whether 
requiring participants to give a best guess prior to fixing 
their confidence interval’s end-points would affect its width 
and thus their levels of overconfidence.  
Looking at the data in Table 2 and Figure 3, one sees little 
difference between the ranges provided in the two 
conditions of interest (Simple and Triangular). While 
participants in the Triangular condition gave, on average, 
narrower ranges (M = 84.7, SD = 61.8) than they did in the 
Simple condition (M = 100.3, SD = 105.0) the confidence 
intervals in Figure 3 indicate no significant difference 
between these values. A repeated measures ANOVA, 
similarly, compared the mean levels of confidence indicated 
by participants in the three conditions where this was 
directly assessed (all but the MOLE) and this found no 
significant differences between the conditions, F(2,67) = 
2.26, p = .112. Even were the differences significant, 
however, overconfidence would not be greatly affected as 
the 3.3% decrease in the number of hits is offset by the 
2.9% decrease in stated levels of confidence.  
Iterative Elicitation 
The final research question related to whether an automated 
system would be effective in prompting participants to 
reconsider and widen their ranges. Looking again at Table 2 
and Figure 3, one sees that there seems to be a weak effect 
in line with expectations. Participants’ ranges in the 
Iterative condition were wider than in the Simple condition 
(M = 105.5, SD = 85.0 compared to M = 100.3, SD = 105.0) 
but not significantly so as examination of the CIs in Figure 
3 shows. Similarly, the difference in confidence, while 
noticeable in Table 2, is not significant – as the repeated 
measures ANOVA described above indicated.  
Discussion 
Our results show a clear benefit to the use of the MOLE 
heuristic elicitation technique in terms of both the precision 
and the accuracy of elicited ranges. We found little support, 
however, for the role of initial best guesses or simplistic 
emphasis on counter-intuitive values in improving 
elicitations. These results are discussed in greater depth 
below. 
Heuristic Elicitation 
It seems reasonable to conclude that elicitation techniques 
enabling people to use the well-honed, heuristic judgment 
and decision tools already at their disposal are powerful 
tools for reducing bias. The degree of overconfidence 
observed in the MOLE responses was much smaller than in 
the other conditions, particularly given that when asked for 
a wide confidence interval (80% plus), people tend to give 
~50% intervals (Morgan & Henrion, 1990) and the MOLE 
generated a 100% interval. 
Of greater interest is the fact that this method works not 
just by causing people to consider more values, thereby 
including a wider range of possibilities (i.e., increasing 
subjective accuracy by helping people realize the limits of 
their knowledge) but also by improving their objective 
accuracy. That is, while participants in the other conditions 
proved poor at estimating the true number of objects 
displayed, repeatedly judging which option was closer to the 
true value resulted in participants in the MOLE condition 
having a better idea of what that true value was. 
This supports the idea from the bounded rationality 
(Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001) literature that enabling people 
to answer questions in formats they are adept with is a good 
way to avoid bias in judgment and decision making. 
Limitations  
There are several caveats, however, regarding the current 
MOLE method. It could, for example, be argued that the 
MOLE gave participants an unfair advantage in that it 
limited the range of values that the contrast values could be 
selected from to between 0 and 400 (remembering that the 
true value was always between 100 and 300). Figure 4 
shows that, in the non-heuristic conditions, a number of 
estimates lie beyond this range, meaning that participants 
had the opportunity to be more inaccurate than in the 
MOLE. That said, the vast majority (98.1%) of estimates 
from all other conditions fell within that range – it having 
been chosen as a reasonable estimate of the range of 
responses – so any effect from this would be limited. The 
other relevant result for this issue is the qualitative 
difference in the scatterplots, which shows better accuracy 
in the MOLE condition across the full range of stimuli. 
Additionally, the need for bounds limits the usefulness of 
the MOLE, as currently formalized, to situations where 
limits can be put on what people might believe (although 
these limits can be very broad due to the MOLE’s iterative 
narrowing of the range to exclude infeasible values). There 
remains, however, a risk of limiting the outcomes a person 
is allowed to choose. That said, this should not be a problem 
in many applied domains where expert knowledge is being 
sought - where there are, often, known limits on outcomes. 
Finally, the MOLE requires participants to spend more 
time observing the stimulus and thus some of the effect may 
simply be noise reduction – although this would seem only 
to explain improvements in accuracy, not precision. This 
also has the effect of increasing the effort required per trial 
with the resultant problem that more participants gave 
nonsensical answers indicative of random button pushing in 
the MOLE (18 of the 20 excluded trials). This is, however, 
unlikely to cause a problem in applied setting as large 
numbers of values tend not to be elicited simultaneously. 
Future Directions 
Given our findings, it seems worthwhile to continue looking 
at heuristic-based elicitation as a method for avoiding bias 
in elicited responses. In addition to extending its use to non-
visual elicitation tasks, an obvious direction is to refine the 
MOLE procedure such that it can automatically determine if 
a person has reached the limits of their certainty, rather than 
requiring a set number of questions. 
The application of this approach to other biases that 
impact on elicited responses such as anchoring would also 
be of interest - given how resistant to debiasing anchoring 
has proved (Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996). 
Finally, while we believe the focus on relative judgments 
is an important advance in developing elicitation methods, it 
should be possible to improve the way in which subjective 
PDFs are generated. The current method was chosen so as to 
minimize the assumptions needing to be made, but remains 
somewhat ad hoc in nature. One interesting possibility is to 
follow the recent lead of Sanborn and Griffiths (in press), 
who apply modern computational Bayesian sampling 
algorithms, based on Markov-Chain Monte Carlo methods, 
as experimental procedures for understanding the subjective 
probability distributions people use to represent mental 
categories. Applying the same principled ideas to the 
problem of value elicitation is a promising direction for 
future research. 
Other Issues 
While previous work has found estimated ranges to be either 
narrowed (Russo & Schoemaker, 1992) or widened (Block 
& Harper, 1991) by initial best guesses, the present study, 
despite stronger control over question order, has found no 
clear effect - although a weak trend was seen towards 
narrowed ranges resulting from initial best guesses. As such, 
this remains an open research question, with further work 
required to tease out the intricacies of this variable effect.  
Neither did we find any evidence that simply indicating to 
people that other people had made estimates well outside 
their own range had any impact on revisions of those 
estimates. It could, however, be that participants realized 
that these “other participants” were computer generated and 
that future research will determine what sort and how much 
counter-intuitive evidence people need to provoke them into 
changing their mind – or whether this only occurs with the 
presence of a known expert (Hawkins et al., 2002). 
Conclusion 
Heuristic-based elicitation methods seem to be a worthwhile 
addition to the arsenal of researchers interested in reducing 
the impact of bias on elicited responses. While the fine 
detail still requires further refinement, the basic premise, of 
using relative rather absolute judgments, is strongly 
supported by the findings herein and the concept seems well 
placed to contribute to our understanding of how our 
cognitive abilities give rise to bias and to aid in improving 
the accuracy of forecasting in a variety of areas. 
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